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Sinn Fein originally came into 
political prominence in Northern Ireland as 
the political wing of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), yet in the last decade Sinn Fein 
has become recognized as a legitimate 
political party. As Sinn Fein joined the 
mainstream political process, however, the 
Unionists, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
even Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern 
questioned its continued affiliation with the 
IRA and demanded the IRA and Republicans 
resort to entirely peaceful, democratic means 
to their political ends. In July 2005, the IRA 
acceded to this demand, “formally order[ing] 
an end to the armed campaign” and 
instructing all Volunteers to use “exclusively 
peaceful means” (“IRA Statement,” 2005). In 
August, the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning verified 
that the IRA had put all weapons beyond use. 
Given its origins, can Sinn Fein 
remain a viable political party without an 
active IRA supporting it?  Sinn Fein President 
Gerry Adams has insisted that “There would 
be no peace process if it were not for the 
IRA” (Adams as cited in Maillot, 2005, p. 
85). Yet, it is also Adams who pressured the 
IRA to pursue peaceful, political means. We 
argue that, in fact, Sinn Fein has grown 
beyond it origins and can function as a viable 
political party without the support of an active 
IRA. This case study uses a three-part 
analysis to make this argument. First, 
following an exploration of the reasons 
Northern Ireland Republicans resorted to 
violence, we assert that many of these reasons 
no longer hold true and, thus, there is no 
reason for terrorism or an active IRA. Second, 
we examine the shifts in Sinn Fein’s core 
beliefs and political priorities. Finally, we 
consider the attitudes of Catholics in Northern 
Ireland toward IRA decommissioning and 
disbandment. All three point to changed 
circumstances in the Catholic community in 
Northern Ireland that imbue Sinn Fein with 
political legitimacy among Republicans and 
Nationalists1 despite – or perhaps because of 
– the recently inactive IRA. 
 Although there is no agreed-upon 
definition of terrorism, the scholarly literature 
provides numerous precipitating factors and 
reasons that might propel a group such as the 
IRA to terrorism. Rarely is it a single 
motivating factor that causes an organization 
to turn to violence. Instead, it is often a 
combination of historical, political, economic, 
social, strategic, and ethnic/nationalist factors 
that prompt terrorism (Gross, 1969; Harmon, 
2000; Kegley, 2000; Simonsen & Spindlove, 
2000; Howard, 2004). All of these factors are 
related and intertwined with one another. Of 
these many factors, those specifically 
pertinent to Republicans in Northern Ireland 
are: history of violence, use of terrorism as a 
last resort, discrimination, lack of political 
voice and legitimacy, and desire for publicity. 
 We use these pertinent factors to 
examine the sociopolitical climate in Northern 
Ireland prior to and after the 1990s peace 
process which culminated in the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement. We choose the 1990s 
peace process as a line of demarcation 
because it is during the peace process that 
Sinn Fein comes to be recognized as a 
mainstream political party and because the 
                                                          
1 The usage of the terms Catholics and Protestants to 
identify the two communities in Northern Ireland is 
common but imprecise. Those on the Catholic side are 
generally Nationalists, seeking reunification with 
Ireland using constitutional means. With the category 
of Nationalists we also find Republicans, a term used 
to describe those who seek immediate reunification and 
are willing to use unconstitutional means – violence – 
to achieve it. This paper focuses on Republicans. On 
the Protestant side, Unionists seek to remain a part of 
the United Kingdom; Loyalists are those Unionists so 
strongly committed to union that they will also use 
violence to achieve their purpose. 
 
IRA begins to trust political means enough to 
enter ceasefire. By applying these reasons for 
terrorism to Northern Ireland in two time 
periods, we establish that there was 
previously a perceived need for terrorist IRA 
violence2 but that, entering and after the 
1990s, there is much less of a perceived need 
for violence on the part of Republicans. 
 We focus on the Irish Republican 
Army or IRA as the predominant Republican 
paramilitary organization as well as the one 
most closely associated with Sinn Fein. The 
IRA is considered one of the best-organized 
terrorist organizations of modern times 
(Simonsen & Spindlove, 2000). The main 
goals of the IRA are and always have been to 
remove British rule from all of Ireland and the 
creation of a sovereign thirty-two county Irish 
Republic. The IRA that, until recently, 
operated in Ireland is officially known as the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, having 
split in the 1970s from what was known as the 
Official IRA. Any mention of the IRA in this 
paper refers only to the Provisional IRA. 
There were and are, of course, other 
Republican paramilitaries, including the Real 
IRA. We deal with those only insofar as they 
relate to our research question; the literature 
on Northern Ireland’s paramilitaries is already 
well-developed.  
 Any group that has an historical past 
that condones the use of violence may be 
more amenable to resorting to the use of 
terrorism. When a group has used force in the 
past, particularly if it has achieved some 
measure of success through violence, that 
group is more likely to embrace the use or 
threat of violence to achieve its goals 
(Kegley, 2000). The roots of the IRA can be 
found in the turbulent and violent history of 
Ireland.  
 From the Norman invasion in 1169 to 
the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 to Wolfe 
Tone and the 1798 rebellion to the Easter 
Uprising of 1916, there has been armed Irish 
resistance to the British presence in Ireland. 
                                                          
2 We argue that Republicans in Northern Ireland 
believed terrorism was necessary; we do not condone 
terrorism ourselves. 
At times successful and at times not, this long 
history of violence between the Irish and 
British throws its shadow upon the Northern 
Ireland conflict today. The history of the IRA 
itself traces back to earlier militias including 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Irish 
Volunteers, with its formal founding in 1919 
(Tonge, 2002). The 1919 – 1921 War of 
Independence marked success  
for the IRA, as Ireland gained independence 
from Britain. This successful past strongly 
influences the 1960s-1990s IRA campaigns in 
Northern Ireland, giving the organization 
hope and sense of romantic nostalgia. 
However, the result of the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty was the partition of Ireland in 1921 
when the twenty-six counties in the South 
became the Irish Free State and the six 
counties in the North, which were 
predominantly Protestant, remained under 
British rule. The IRA continued to fight 
partition, but with little success or even 
support between the 1920s and 1960s. In fact, 
one IRA campaign against the British in 
Northern Ireland from 1956 – 1962 faded out 
due to lack of popular support and the IRA in 
Northern Ireland all but ceased to operate 
(McKittrick & McVea, 2002).  
 Partition is, of course, a direct 
precipitating cause of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland from the 1960s to 1990s. 
The late 1960s civil rights movement by 
Catholics in Northern Ireland sought 
moderate political and economic reforms to 
end discrimination – not reunification with 
the South (Stohl, 1983). Catholic Nationalist 
protesters marched in the streets of Belfast, 
Londonderry, and other cities in an attempt to 
bring attention to their plight. But these 
marches were met with violence by Unionist 
extremists and police (McKittrick & McVea, 
2002). Because the Protestant Unionist 
majority controlled the government and 
police, the Catholic Nationalists felt helpless 
and vulnerable. This feeling was magnified 
when, in the late 1960s, Loyalist crowds 
burned down entire streets of houses in 
Catholic sectors, displacing some 1,500 
Catholic families (McKittrick & McVea, 
2002). While some accuse the IRA of using 
 
the civil rights marches as cover for violence 
or even fronting the movement (Tonge, 
2002), others insist the organization was 
basically disorganized and unarmed at this 
point in time. Following the burnings is when 
“the bitter phrase ‘IRA – I ran away’ is 
famously said to have appeared on a wall in 
the Falls Road area, reflecting the feelings of 
the working-class nationalists in west and 
north Belfast that the IRA had failed them.”  
In Making Sense of the Troubles, McKittrick 
and McVea (2002) argue that: 
 
the practical reality was that the 
majority of Catholics did not support 
the IRA, and looked to them only in 
times of high tension. In such times, 
and August 1969 was one of them, the 
IRA was supposed to protect areas 
such as the Falls and Ardoyne against 
attack. . . . The consensus in the 
Catholic ghetto backstreets was that an 
effective defence force was needed, 
and so a new IRA came into being. 
This new group may have emerged to 
defend the ghettos, but it would before 
long develop into an aggressive killing 
machine. (p. 59-60) 
 
On January 31, 1972, known as 
Bloody Sunday, a peaceful civil rights march 
turned violent when the British army fired on 
the crowd and 13 demonstrators were killed (a 
14th died later as a result of his injuries). The 
march had been called to protest internment, 
the imprisonment without trial of thousands 
of Catholic men as suspected IRA members. 
In retaliation, the IRA shot and killed thirteen 
British army troops (McKittrick & McVea, 
2002; Tonge, 2002). This was a turning point 
for the IRA. Internment and Bloody Sunday 
were perceived as oppression that specifically 
targeted the Nationalist community in 
Northern Ireland (Maillot, 2005). 
Disillusioned by their failure to achieve 
change through peaceful civil protest and 
political pressure, many Nationalists grew 
more amenable to the IRA’s use of terrorist 
violence to force political change.  
Terrorism is commonly the option of 
last resort. When other means to effect change 
have failed, frustration and anger sometimes 
lead groups to perform a cost/benefit analysis 
that results in the use of violence to force an 
issue. Often a group has attempted to effect 
change through political means or through 
peaceful protest, and when these efforts are 
ineffective a group might explore the use of 
terrorism (Howard, 2004). As the civil rights 
movement disintegrated and Bloody Sunday 
further inflamed the Nationalist community, 
the disillusionment and desperation of many 
Catholic Nationalists in Northern Ireland 
made violence the only option remaining. 
IRA recruitment during this period grew 
enormously. 
The portion of the Catholic Nationalist 
community in Northern Ireland that considers 
itself Republican shares a long history of 
armed struggle. In the centuries since the 
Norman invasion, the Irish Catholics have 
fought many armed battles with the 
Protestants, thereby creating a tradition of 
violence. The IRA represents this history of 
armed resistance and defiance. Combined 
with the long and failed battle against 
inequality in Northern Ireland, it thus seems 
almost inevitable that some Republicans 
would see the use of force as the only avenue 
for change.  
 The failed Catholic civil rights 
movement sought to end discrimination in 
Northern Ireland. Discrimination is frequently 
a key factor in causing a group to contemplate 
the use of terrorism, especially minority 
groups. Discrimination can take many forms: 
lack of housing, unemployment, 
discrimination by the police and/or the state, 
political oppression and lack of self-
determination (Kegley, 2000). A group, 
particularly a minority group, that is unable to 
have its perceived grievances of 
discrimination addressed may opt to use force 
or the threat of force in order to achieve a 
measure of equality. In particular, if a group 
believes that the police discriminate against it, 
the group may feel unprotected and 
vulnerable and this might drive the group to 
resort to the use of force to counterbalance the 
 
feeling of weakness. If a social movement 
bands together to fight discrimination, but the 
majority either refuses to deal with the issues 
or perhaps does not even think that the 
minority has any valid issues that require 
attention, then terrorism may be used by an 
extremist portion of the movement (Kegley, 
2000). Those who are weak relative to the 
government become impatient from a lack of 
action achieved by the peaceful movement, 
and use terrorism as a tool to bring their 
concerns to the forefront and force change 
onto the majority’s political agenda.  
 Discrimination against Irish Catholics 
in (Northern) Ireland also has a long history, 
dating back to the Penal Laws of the 1600s 
and 1700s. Through laws restricting 
education, land distribution, and practice of 
religion among others, Catholics were 
stripped of legal, social, political, and 
economic power (Stohl, 1983). The Penal 
Laws were repealed over time, but left a 
lingering perception of discrimination and 
victimization among the Catholics that was 
inflamed by more modern periods and forms 
of discrimination. While some Unionists may 
deny that discrimination occurred in Northern 
Ireland, there is general scholarly agreement 
that it did (Tonge, 2002). As well, even 
Unionist-sympathetic British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher admitted that “There was 
no getting away from the fact that . . . the long 
years of Unionist rule were associated with 
discrimination against Catholics” (quoted in 
McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 156). 
In the 1960s, Catholics suffered 
discrimination in three main areas: housing, 
employment, and elections. In Belfast, where 
the population of Catholics had risen, the 
Nationalists faced poverty and many lived in 
slums. After World War II there was a surge 
in the building of new housing in Northern 
Ireland, but even though the Catholics lived in 
the poorest sections, much of the new housing 
was allotted to the Protestant population 
(Tonge, 2002). The Protestants held most of 
the positions in the city councils and were the 
ones who determined the distribution of the 
new housing, therefore granting Catholics 
proportionately less housing than the 
Protestants (McKenna, 2005). The most 
blatant acts of discrimination in the 
distribution of new housing occurred when 
single Protestants were given opportunities 
for new housing before Catholic families 
were. There also existed discrepancies in the 
condition of the housing for each community. 
In 1971, only 63 percent of Catholic homes in 
Northern Ireland had hot water or a private 
indoor bathroom, while 72 percent of the 
Protestant homes did (McKenna, 2005).  
 Catholics were also victims of 
discrimination in regards to employment. In 
Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 
Jonathan Tonge (2002) argues that there was 
discrimination in three main areas: location, 
employment, and access to civil service 
position. First, Catholics were disadvantaged 
when new industry was located in 
predominantly Protestant areas of the region. 
“Areas with Catholic majorities received only 
three-quarters of the amount of employment 
location awards enjoyed by Protestants 
between 1949 –1963” (p. 22).  Second, 
unemployment rates were twice as high 
among Catholic workers as among Protestant 
workers (Tonge, 2002). “In the private sector, 
many large firms, and indeed whole 
industries, commonly had workforces that 
were more than 90 percent Protestant . . . 
Moreover, there were, at times of high 
tension, periodic purges in which Catholic 
workers were forcibly expelled from some of 
the big companies” (McKittrick & McVea, 
2002, p. 11-12). 
Third, Catholics were excluded from 
the higher positions in both the public and 
private sector. Catholics accounted for only 
10 percent of the jobs in the civil service, and 
virtually none of these jobs were in the higher 
ranks. A 1943 survey illustrated that there 
were “no Catholics in the 55 most senior jobs 
and only 37 Catholics in 600 middle-ranking 
posts” (McKittrick and McVea, 2002, p. 11). 
In the private sector, most of the jobs held by 
Catholics were unskilled labor and lower 
paying jobs such as factory workers, while 
Protestants occupied higher paying jobs in 
industries such as shipbuilding. In general in 
all types of professions, Catholics tended to 
 
occupy the lowest ranks. For example, in the 
white-collar industries Catholics held the 
clerical positions while Protestants held the 
managerial positions (Hancock, 1998; 
McKittrick & McVea, 2002; Tonge, 2002).  
 The Catholics were also subject to 
discrimination in the electoral process. 
According to the 1920 Government of Ireland 
Act, elections in Northern Ireland were to be 
conducted under proportional representation, 
which was designed to include representation 
of the Nationalist minority. However, by 
1922, the Unionist government abandoned 
this system and implemented a “first-past-the-
post” system in local elections. This system 
ensured an enduring single-party Unionist 
government (Tonge, 2002). In addition, only 
local home-owning ratepayers were allowed 
to vote. Since the majority of Catholics did 
not own homes, many could not participate in 
local elections, ensuring Unionist dominance 
in local government. And, to complete the 
circle, those Unionists elected to local 
councils determined the future distribution of 
housing – and, therefore, votes.  
Gerrymandering, the practice of 
manipulating electoral boundaries, also 
further disenfranchised the Catholics. Voting 
districts were created to ensure a Unionist 
majority, even in predominantly Nationalist 
areas. In 1922, “as a result of the changes 
Nationalists lost their majorities in thirteen of 
the twenty-four councils they had originally 
controlled.”  The city of Londonderry had a 
firm Nationalist majority, but gerrymandering 
allowed Unionist control of the city council: 
“7,500 Unionist voters returned twelve 
councilors while 10,000 Nationalist voters 
returned only eight” (McKittrick & McVea, 
2002, p. 8). 
Through such political discrimination 
and purposeful political structural changes, 
the Catholics were left virtually without a 
voice in the political system of Northern 
Ireland. This lack of political influence was 
compounded when the civil rights movement 
was outlawed and destroyed by the Northern 
Ireland government at Stormont. When the 
concerns of a group have gone largely 
ignored, a group may decide to use terrorism 
in order to force the government and other 
entities to take notice (Harmon, 2000). 
Terrorism is used to expose the state as 
discriminatory, oppressive, and illegitimate 
(Kegley, 2000). “Insurgent groups use terror 
to undermine the status quo and to achieve 
some political power” (Harmon, 2000, p. 45). 
When terrorism is used to force political 
change on the agenda, a government that had 
chosen to reject to the goals of a political 
movement cannot ignore the actions of that 
now-terrorist group (Howard, 2004).  
Terrorism is also used to gain 
recognition, attention and/or publicity. A 
group that feels disenfranchised and without a 
political voice may use terrorism to publicize 
its cause and to force its opponent and also its 
allies to take it seriously. Quite often, after a 
terrorist organization has taken violent action, 
a public announcement will follow in which it 
takes responsibility for and outlines its 
justifications for that act. Terrorism is utilized 
to bring attention to the terrorists’ ideology by 
causing an act that is shocking and forces the 
public to take notice (Simonsen and 
Spindlove, 2000). Terrorists use the media to 
gain the most attention possible.  
In addition to being denied a political 
voice through electoral discrimination, the 
Republicans in Northern Ireland were denied 
a public voice. Both the Republic of Ireland 
and United Kingdom censored the Republican 
media. For almost twenty years Sinn Fein was 
banned from the state-owned media in the 
Republic of Ireland (Maillot, 2005). Section 
31 of the 1960 Broadcasting Act gave the 
Irish Minister for Post and Telegraphs the 
authority to ban broadcasts of any 
organization that promotes the use of 
violence. Sinn Fein’s connection to the IRA 
was the basis of this proclamation, and 
therefore any interviews with Sinn Fein party 
members were not allowed to be broadcast on 
state television or radio. In 1988, British 
Secretary of State Douglas Hurd stated that 
there would be ‘restrictions’ on electronic 
media coverage of Sinn Fein (Welsh, 2005, 
p.2). The British government’s restrictions 
were not as severe as those of the Republic, as 
Sinn Fein was allowed coverage during 
 
elections. However, the censorship by both 
governments increased perceptions of 
oppression among Republicans as well as 
unfair reporting of Republican events and the 
dissemination of misinformation.  
By closing legitimate channels of 
publicity and communication for Sinn Fein, 
the British and Irish governments 
inadvertently accelerated the IRA’s use of 
violence. Terrorism was perceived by many to 
be the only way to draw attention to the plight 
of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. 
In conducting a well-organized campaign of 
terrorism, the IRA achieved success in 
focusing world attention on its cause. While 
the worldview was not always sympathetic 
towards the Republicans, the IRA’s acts of 
terrorism did ultimately serve to gain 
publicity and recognition for the Republicans 
(Harmon, 2000). 
A combination of history, desperation, 
discrimination, and lack of political and 
public voice contributed to the IRA’s use of 
terrorism during the Troubles. According to 
Gross (1969), conditions contributing to 
political terrorism include: “the perception of 
sociopolitical conditions of oppression” and 
“the presence of active personality types who 
are willing to make a political choice and 
respond with direct action and violence to 
conditions of oppression” (p. 120). These 
conditions were present in Northern Ireland 
from the 1960s until the 1990s; therefore, 
terrorism was present in Northern Ireland 
from the 1960s until the 1990s. 
But conditions in Northern Ireland 
slowly changed through the 1980s and into 
the 1990s. The pertinent factors that prompted 
terrorism earlier in the Troubles began to 
decrease or even disappear. The long history 
of Republican violence certainly did not 
change, but the much more recent violent 
history of the Troubles did. According to 
former US Senator George Mitchell (1999), 
the independent chairman of the peace talks 
that led to the Good Friday Agreement, as the 
1980s turned into the 1990s, “families began 
to long for a more normal life, one not 
dominated by fear and hatred.” Even among 
Republicans, “the people long for peace. They 
are sick of war, weary of anxiety and fear. 
They still have differences, but they want to 
settle them through democratic dialogue” (p. 
xii, 19). The history of violence that made 
terrorism acceptable was superseded by war 
weariness.  
There were, of course, attempts at 
peace over the years; only rarely did those 
attempts include Sinn Fein as the political 
representatives of the Republicans and the 
IRA. Republicans, roughly 30-40% of the 
Nationalist community, still had no political 
voice and, thus, still perceived the need to 
resort to violence to gain a voice. But when 
the Hume-Adams talks and “back channel” 
between the British and Sinn Fein bore 
political fruit in the early 1990s and, more 
importantly, Sinn Fein was allowed into peace 
negotiations in the mid-1990s, the 
Republicans again had a political voice. 
Moderate Catholic Nationalists had long since 
regained a political role, making violence no 
longer necessary as a last resort in their view. 
As Republicans’ own policies evolved from 
violence only to the “ballot box and armalite,” 
they began to regain their political voice. As 
the British and Irish governments and the 
Nationalists began to hear that voice, and 
began to recognize Sinn Fein as a legitimate 
political party, Republicans such as Gerry 
Adams used that voice and increasingly 
sought political means to their ends. 
Republican concerns were no longer going 
unheard and violence was no longer their only 
perceived means for achieving their goals. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Irish Catholic minority in Northern Ireland 
also saw a decrease in discrimination. Once 
the British established direct rule from 
London, they began policy initiatives that 
reduced discrimination in housing, 
employment, and politics. By 1972, local 
councils dominated by Protestant Unionists 
no longer controlled allocation of housing; the 
Northern Ireland Housing Executive was a 
regional government body that solved the 
“problem of systematic unfair housing 
allocation” (Darby, 1997, p. 80). According to 
John Darby (1997), Scorpions in a Bottle, by 
the 1990s, “Catholics and Protestants 
 
occup[ied] houses of similar quality . . . On 
balance, housing is a rare example of a major 
grievance which has been virtually removed 
from the political agenda through changes in 
government policy and practice” (p. 80). The 
1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act also 
established the Standing Advisory 
Commission on Human Rights to evaluate 
whether the laws against discrimination were 
being upheld (Fitzduff, n.d.). In 1998, the 
Equality Commission was established under 
the Good Friday Agreement. It monitors and 
investigates any charges of discrimination in 
housing or employment (Equality 
Commission, n.d.). 
The British government strengthened 
its fair employment legislation in 1976 and 
again in 1989 in an effort to mitigate 
employment discrimination against Catholics. 
Since this legislation went into effect, the 
proportion of Catholic men and women has 
increased in virtually every occupational 
group (Bew, Patterson, Teague, 1997). 
Unemployment remains disproportionately 
greater for Catholics than Protestants. 
According to the British government, in 2003 
the unemployment rate for Catholic men was 
9 percent compared with 5 percent for 
Protestant men. Among women, the 
unemployment rates were 6 percent for 
Catholics compared with 3 percent for 
Protestants (“Northern Ireland Labour 
Market” 2004). Still, this is better than before 
the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. For 
example, statistics furnished by the 
Continuous Household Survey in 1983 states 
that the male unemployment rate for 
Catholics was around 35 percent, while the 
rate for Protestants was 15 percent (Rawthorn 
and Wayne, 1988). This illustrates a dramatic 
improvement in the proportion of 
unemployment figures, and the Good Friday 
Agreement has provisions to further reduce 
the disparities. 
Like housing discrimination, unfair 
electoral practices ended with direct rule. 
“Paradoxically, the removal of local 
democracy in Northern Ireland may have 
accelerated the systematic removal of 
minority inequalities.” During the early 
1970s, the British government enacted voting 
reform legislation that ended gerrymandering, 
unequal franchise rights tied to home 
ownership, and other unfair voting practices 
in local elections. “Electoral grievances were 
effectively removed from the political 
agenda” (Darby, 1997, p. 60, 80).  
The British government has been 
withdrawing its troops from Northern Ireland. 
Efforts were also made to change the make-up 
of the mostly Protestant police force, by 
actively recruiting Catholics and changing its 
name from the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) to the more benign sounding Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). These 
changes in legislation and organization reduce 
structural discrimination against Catholics in 
Northern Ireland, which in turn helps create 
an atmosphere less conducive to terrorism. 
State-sponsored censorship has also 
ended. Both the Irish and British governments 
have lifted bans on Sinn Fein interviews and 
publicity. Sinn Fein is free to publicize its 
cause in the media, and does so. Gerry Adams 
is very vocal, and gives speeches and 
interviews on a daily basis. The Republicans 
also publish their own newspaper, An 
Phoblacht. No longer is there a need to draw 
attention to Republican issues through means 
of spectacular violence. In the global political 
climate since the terrorist acts on September 
11, 2001, the use of terrorism is abhorred and 
unlikely to draw sympathetic support from the 
international community. In fact, the use of 
terrorism by the IRA could have the opposite 
effect; it would most likely repulse the public 
and alienate the international community. It is 
definitely to the advantage of Republicans to 
utilize their restored political and public 
voices rather than violence. 
In Gross’ (1969) terms, then, the 
“perceptions of sociopolitical conditions of 
oppression” have diminished among Northern 
Irish Republicans to the extent that they no 
longer feel terrorism is their only option. As 
well, we can take Sinn Fein President Gerry 
Adams as an example of an “active 
personality type . . . willing to make a 
political choice and respond with direct 
action” – but no longer willing to have that 
 
action be violent. Adams’ rhetoric has 
changed over the years, from overtly 
supporting the armed struggle to a firmer 
stance against using violent methods to 
achieve Sinn Fein’s goals. In a speech 
directed to the IRA on April 6, 2005, he 
acknowledged the IRA’s role in the struggle 
for a united Ireland, but also urged them to 
consider purely political means: 
 
In the past, I have defended the right 
of the IRA to engage in armed 
struggle…Now there is an alternative. 
I have clearly set out my view of what 
that alternative is. The way forward is 
by building political support for 
republican and democratic objectives 
across Ireland and by winning support 
for these goals internationally. 
(Adams, 2005, para. 19) 
 
Just as the overall situation in 
Northern Ireland has changed, under Gerry 
Adams’ leadership Sinn Fein itself has 
changed. As Jonathan Tonge (2002) argues in 
Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, Sinn 
Fein has grown beyond its status as the 
“political wing of the IRA” and shifted some 
of its core beliefs and political positions. 
Although Sinn Fein as a political party 
predates partition, the incarnation that we 
know today began as “little more than a flag 
of convenience for the IRA” (McKittrick & 
McVea, 2002, p. 158). Its main ideological 
and political goals emphasized a united 
Ireland, the end of British colonial control of 
Northern Ireland, the existence of a unique 
Irish culture and nation, and the historical 
right to use force to achieve these goals 
(Tonge, 2002). During the height of IRA 
activity in the 1970s, few Republicans 
accepted the use of political tactics to achieve 
these goals. Republicans, including Gerry 
Adams at the time, were afraid that “what 
they pejoratively referred to as ‘electoralism’ . 
. . would blunt the IRA’s revolutionary edge” 
(McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 158).  
In the 1980s, however, the military 
stalemate, war-weariness, and the IRA hunger 
strikes brought Sinn Fein and political 
methods to the forefront of the Republican 
campaign. The decision was made to utilize 
both political and military means to achieve 
Republican goals. This decision sets the stage 
for later developments such as the Hume-
Adams talks, the 1990s IRA ceasefire, and, 
ultimately, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement 
(Tonge, 2002). 
 As these developments unfolded, Sinn 
Fein asserted its independence of the IRA3 
and altered it core beliefs and political 
positions, both subtly and dramatically. While 
the unification of Ireland remains a core 
belief, Sinn Fein has accepted the existence of 
Northern Ireland, the (at least temporary) 
legitimacy of the British government to rule 
Northern Ireland, and the principle of consent 
for both Nationalists and Unionists. There 
also began to be a desire to move from “a 
tactically unarmed strategy . . . [to] a totally 
unarmed strategy,” which fundamentally 
shifts the core Sinn Fein position of 
militarism (Tonge, 2002, p. 148).  
 Tonge (2002) further argues that those 
who believe this shift is dramatic also believe 
that “the softening of approach heralds the 
death of republicanism” (p. 150) – the end of 
violence and strict adherence to the historic 
goals of the party. This conclusion was 
obviously reached before the IRA ended its 
campaign, but it emphasizes the fact that, in 
moving away from its own core beliefs, Sinn 
Fein moved into the realm of “a mere 
Nationalist party” or mainstream minority 
party (Tonge, 2002, p. 150). It is perhaps a 
minority party within the entire Northern 
Ireland context, but Sinn Fein is now the 
majority Nationalist party, gaining more votes 
than the Social Democratic and Labour Party, 
which represents moderate Nationalists. Sinn 
Fein is also the only Northern Ireland party 
active in the south as well as the north. 
 Today, Sinn Fein enjoys greater voter 
backing in both the Republic of Ireland and in 
                                                          
3 There is, of course, still considerable debate as to how 
independent Sinn Fein is of the IRA. For the purposes 
of this paper, we accept the party’s line that the two 
organizations no longer share leadership; therefore, we 
accept that their insistence that there is no longer an 
“organic” relationship. 
 
Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein support has 
slowly increased in the Republic over the last 
ten years (Maillot, 2005). In the May United 
Kingdom General Election, Sinn Fein won an 
additional seat, making them now the second 
most popular political party in Northern 
Ireland (behind the Democratic Unionist 
Party), and the largest Nationalist party in 
Northern Ireland (“Sinn Fein Win Newry,” 
2005). Gerry Adams took seventy percent of 
the vote in his Belfast West constituency in 
the recent 2005 General Election (Adams and 
Paisley retain Ulster seats, 2005).  
In March 2005, the Belfast Telegraph 
commissioned Millward Brown Ulster to 
conduct a sweeping public opinion poll in 
Northern Ireland. According to this poll, 
forty-four percent of Sinn Fein voters believe 
that the IRA should disband and almost sixty 
percent of Sinn Fein supporters say that the 
IRA should disarm. Forty-eight percent of all 
Sinn Fein voters responded that Gerry Adams 
performed “very well” as party leader; 
although this does represent a slight drop 
from 2003, it is the highest approval rating 
among all party leaders in Northern Ireland. 
The poll also indicated the highest percentage 
of female Sinn Fein voters in 15 years, at 48 
percent (“What Ulster Thinks Now,” 2005). 
The literature has always explained away the 
low percentage of women Sinn Fein voters 
based on that gender’s distaste for violence 
(Malliot, 2005). These statistics indicate that 
Sinn Fein voters no longer require backing 
from the IRA to go hand-in-hand with their 
political party and that Sinn Fein is attracting 
more women voters as they seek primarily 
political means.  
The above elections results and 
opinion polls pre-date the announced end of 
the IRA campaign and decommissioning. Yet 
the polls and election results do indicate that 
Sinn Fein gained in voters and positive public 
opinion as it shifted its political ideals and 
distanced itself from the IRA. This indicates a 
strong likelihood it can survive and even 
thrive without an active IRA.  
 It is, however, important to note that 
not all Republicans have been pleased with 
Sinn Fein’s gradual shift away from its 
origins as the political wing of the IRA and its 
core beliefs. For example, Sinn Fein’s 1986 
decision to enter the Irish Dail after decades 
of abstentionism angered many Republicans, 
some of whom split off and formed 
Republican Sinn Fein (Tonge, 2002, p. 144), a 
dissident party still active today. Sinn Fein’s 
involvement in the 1990s peace process 
further fractured its Republican support, with 
a small but visible group of dissidents 
creating the Thirty-Two County Sovereignty 
Committee in 1997. Dissidents formed not 
only rival political parties, but also rival 
paramilitary organizations. The now-defunct 
Real IRA (rIRA) opposed the IRA ceasefire 
and the 1990s peace process; they were 
responsible for the infamous 1998 Omagh 
bombing. The Continuity IRA (CIRA), which 
is believed to still be active, also opposes the 
IRA ceasefire and the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement (McKittrick & McVea, 2002). 
During September and October 2005, several 
news sources made general references to 
“republican dissidents” attacking police and 
attempting bombings. Such dissident parties 
and paramilitary groups oppose Sinn Fein’s 
current policies and, in some cases, the 
emphasis on peaceful means to end the 
conflict. 
 Sinn Fein recognizes the need for 
support from the IRA’s members and other 
traditional Republicans. As Mark Harrington 
(2005) reports in “New hope, and unease, in 
N. Ireland,” some Republicans are very 
nervous about IRA decommissioning, with 
one interviewee responding, “Who’s going to 
protect us now?”  As noted above, many 
Republicans expect IRA protection in 
dangerous times; decommissioning and the 
end to IRA campaign introduces insecurities 
into Catholic neighborhoods – at the very 
time that Protestant Loyalist feuds are 
exploding into violent riots. Harrington 
(2005) also points out that Gerry Adams has 
acknowledged the need to unite factions 
within the party, quoting from an earlier 
Adams speech: “There’s a big job of 
leadership to be done, because many 
Republicans are only now absorbing the 
impact of the IRA disarmament . . . But it is 
 
up to us to make sure that everybody stays 
united” (n.p.)  Former BBC Ireland 
Correspondent Mark Simpson (2005), gives 
Sinn Fein leaders considerable credit for 
having kept Republicans united thus far: 
“There have been minor defections along the 
way, but Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness have steered the IRA through a 
period of dramatic change without a major 
split – and without being killed. . . . It is a 
remarkable political success story, albeit after 
30 years of death and destruction” (n.p.). 
 While militarism may have ended, 
Sinn Fein promises to remain activist. The 
perceived romanticism of the Republican 
movement included a strong community 
commitment to the cause. For those 
Republicans unwillingly to engage in violence 
during the Troubles, Sinn Fein served as an 
alternative form of participation. Membership 
figures, both past and present, are difficult to 
obtain, though the party claims to be “the 
fastest growing party in Ireland.”  However 
many there are, Sinn Fein has always 
expected and continues to expect a high level 
of commitment from its members, requiring 
them to volunteer their time to sell 
newspapers, hand out leaflets, and participate 
in fundraising and publicity events. The party 
puts special emphasis on the young, and has 
had appeal among them due to its strong 
involvement in local communities and anti-
drug campaigns (Maillot, 2005). A grassroots-
based organization and active membership 
helps integrate Sinn Fein into the 
communities of both Northern Ireland and the 
Republic; this allows it to become ingrained 
in communities and provides a firm base of 
support for the party. 
 It could be an oversimplification to 
insist that Sinn Fein would continue to gain 
support now that the IRA has ended its 
campaign and decommissioned. The polls and 
election results do indicate that Sinn Fein has 
gained in voters and positive public opinion 
as it has ever so slowly shifted its ideals and 
distanced itself from the IRA. However, it has 
been eight years since the Good Friday 
Agreement was signed and it has yet to be 
fully implemented. The fact also remains that 
Northern Ireland is still under direct rule from 
London with no firm estimate of when 
devolved government will return. Even more 
importantly, while Sinn Fein seems willing to 
accept an interim arrangement in a power-
sharing executive with the Unionists, it is 
vital to remember that the ultimate goal is a 
united Ireland. Recent political history in 
Northern Ireland has shown us that success in 
the peace process did not translate into lasting 
electoral or political success for either the 
Nationalist SDLP or Ulster Unionist Party; 
their respective inabilities to deliver upon 
promises related to the Good Friday 
Agreement and the interrelated failure of the 
new Northern Ireland government led to the 
very increase in Sinn Fein support we herald 
here. If Sinn Fein is unable to meet its 
political goals and keep its promises, it could 
face a similar loss of popular support. These 
are, however, the challenges faced by any 
mainstream political party – they do not stem 
from the absence of an active IRA. 
 It is also important to note that there 
remain important avenues for further research 
relative to Sinn Fein’s legitimacy. We focus 
primarily on the party’s ability to maintain 
legitimacy within its own community; other 
players in the Northern Irish political game 
must also grant it legitimacy. While the 
British and Irish governments and non-violent 
Catholic Nationalists seem to have done so, 
the Unionists – especially the extremist Ian 
Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party – 
have no faith or trust in the end of the IRA’s 
campaign or Sinn Fein’s insistence upon 
solely political efforts to manage and resolve 
the conflict. 
 The future of Northern Ireland 
remains to be written, but the region seems to 
be at a very promising crossroads. Changing 
sociopolitical conditions, popular support, and 
internal politics have led Sinn Fein to a 
position of political legitimacy and 
prominence that allows it to represent the 
interests of a majority of the Catholic 
community. It no longer must rely on IRA 
violence to gain political attention. The IRA 
ceasefire – and, very recently, end to the IRA 
campaign – gave Sinn Fein the chance to 
 
prove that political means can achieve 
Republican ends. Two important overarching 
obstacles remain for Sinn Fein: achieving its 
political goals in a timely fashion so as to 
maintain popular support and convincing the 
Unionists that it is a legitimate political party. 
Both will be difficult – particularly the 
ultimate goal of reunification – but we feel 
confident that Sinn Fein currently has the 
legitimacy and popular support to take on the 
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